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5Abstract.
While much work has been done on the expansion of the British economic
empire, its contraction has received less attention. The aim of this paper is to
study in detail how British economic interests retreated from Uruguay after
the Second World War. It also throws some light on how certain Latin
American countries behaved as creditor nations: we know much about their
behaviour as debtors but almost nothing about how they used their creditor
status.
In these negotiations, where financial and economic aspects were closely
linked, Uruguay accepted most of Britain’s demands, including the use of its
sterling balances for the nationalization of the British owned railways. By
doing this, and not buying back its foreign debt, Uruguay was soon in need
to ask for a credit to Britain and thus return to an old pattern of
indebtedness.
6
7The Nationalisation of the British Railways in Uruguay
Giorgio Fodor
University of Trento
The nationalisation of the British railways in Uruguay is, generally
speaking, not very different from the ones in Argentina and Brazil. In all
these cases the railways were bought, not very enthusiastically, in exchange
for sterling balances which were almost impossible to spend otherwise. But
each case has its own peculiarities and it is the details that are especially
interesting. Because of this I have explored in some detail a few aspects of
this process in Uruguay, leaving aside other problems, like commercial
negotiations or the exchange guarantee, that were closely linked with the
sale of the railways. Given my interpretation of what happened, already
explained briefly above, the  particular attention paid here to financial
problems is inevitable. I believe they contain the explanation of much of
what happened.
It is difficult to transmit the “feeling” of these negotiations. In order to
come closer to this aim, I have endeavoured to let the original participants,
insofar as possible, to speak for themselves. I have preferred to quote
extensively instead of paraphrasing the different documents; I hope that this
decision will allow the reader to enjoy a little of the excitement that I have
felt while reading the files. It should also allow him to perceive unexpected
details, which makes each negotiation unique.  It will be clear that I have
seen only the British side of the picture, as recorded by members of a
brilliant Civil Service, who wrote with precision and confidence, knowing
that they were addressing other members of their caste. The Uruguayan
8point of view is completely missing and is only presented as it emerged
from confidences from Uruguayans to the British. I hope that this work will
stimulate others to complete the partial picture I have been able to
reconstruct.
Britain came out of the war seriously weakened, in particular insofar as the
balance of payments was concerned. Her prewar equilibrium had been
precarious and her deficit with the dollar area very marked. Invisibles had
been extremely important but a substantial part of her foreign investments
had been liquidated to finance the war, while a part of her merchant fleet
had been lost. She had also accumulated enormous liabilities in sterling,
both to countries of the Sterling Area and to countries like Argentina, Brazil
and Uruguay. It was clear that Britain would continue to have a deficit in its
balance of payments for some years after the war: in 1945 Keynes estimated
the the British deficit in the three years after victory over Japan would be
£650-£850 million in the first year, about £500 million in the second year
and about £200 million in the third.1 As her sterling liabilities were about £3
billion (at the official rate of exchange about $12 billion) it was clear that
these liabilities not only would not be repaid; it was very likely that they
would  be increased. Already in January 1944 Keynes foresaw that this
would happen in Latin America for the first two years after the war. This
meant that Great Britain would be unable to repay old debts; no only, she
had to make new ones to finance the transition to a peace economy.
  The American Administration was very suspicious of the Sterling Area,
fearing that Britain would use it to resist demands for multilateral, non
discriminatory trade. There was also suspicion that Britain would use this
area to create a closed trading block and many considered trading blocks as
sources of international tensions that ended in war. And they didn’t want
that their financial aid to Britain leaked elsewhere. They were therefore very
favourable to unilateral cancellation of a substantial part of these sterling
balances. In the Anglo-American negotiations of September 1945, Keynes
presented a plan in which of the £3 billion of sterling balances a third would
be cancelled, 10% of the rest made convertible for current account purposes
and the rest, equivalent to $7.2 billion at the official exchange rate, would be
funded at no interest to be repaid over fifty years, with annual instalments of
2% beginning after five years. The plan of the US Treasury was to buy $5
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9billion of sterling balances with $3 billion of US currency , of the remaining
$8 billion, $4 would be cancelled, $2 billion freed as working balances
while the last $2 billion would be used to offset British foreign installations,
etc.2
 At the US Treasury there was a very accurate understanding of the real
worth of these sterling balances. “Without American assistance to Britain,
the value of the $13 billion of blocked sterling claims against Britain is, on a
realistic appraisal, almost nil.”3  At the end of 1945 reserves of the sterling
area were about £500 million against liabilities to the Sterling Area of about
£3 billion.4 What was to become India, Pakistan and Ceylon had £1358
million, the Middle East about £590 million and Latin America about £166
million.
To put matters in perspective it is important to keep in mind that  Uruguay
had about £17 million. This was a small amount for Britain, but a large one
for Uruguay that hoped to use it to refurbish its dilapidated economy. On the
other hand, it should be noticed that the Bank of England in the Spring of
1946 envisaged releasing to the whole world only between £100 million and
£60 million per year. Britain needed all the dollars it had to finance its own
needs, and did not want to use its scarce exports to pay old debts; they had
to be used to pay for current imports. On the other hand, for other countries,
exporting to Britain without being paid neither with exports nor dollars was
not very different than throwing goods into the sea.5 It benefited the
producers of exportable goods at the expense of the rest of the population,
who had to bear the inflationary consequences of these useless exports.
Britain’s problem was that she wanted to be able to pay in sterling, and in
order to obtain this it was almost impossible to cancel unilaterally the
existing sterling debts. It also had to give some inducements to holders of
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sterling, in the form of a partial release, that is allowing a partial use of this
old sterling to buy in other areas, which meant converting them into dollars.
The Anglo-Financial Agreement, with the loan of $3.75 billion, placed
some stringent obligations on Britain. These dollars could not be used to
repay sterling balances 6 and one year after the Agreement came into force
sterling earned on current account had to be made convertible. This meant
that after July 15 1947 countries could earn dollars by having a current
account surplus with Britain. For countries like Argentina and Canada, with
a big surplus with Britain and a big deficit with the US, this was an
enormous benefit.
It is in this context that the sale of the railways has to be seen. Britain
couldn’t export enough but had foreign investments in Latin America. They
were in a bad state and had very unpromising perspectives, but the fact that
Latin American countries had a huge amount of sterling which they could
not use presented an unique opportunity. If the railways could be sold at a
good price shareholders would be saved from certain ruin and a good part of
the sterling debt would be wiped out. Sterling could even become scarce for
these countries and therefore they would be keen to export to Britain. In
short, the chaotic situation of the early postwar period seemed to offer a
chance of salvation for the British shareholders of Latin American railways.
To grasp this chance, that vastly benefited the balance of payments, was the
aim of British negotiators.
Their view of the prospects of the British railways in Uruguay was
extremely negative.
“The Railway, with a nominal capital of £15 million, are our biggest single
capital investment in Uruguay. Their financial future is precarious in the
extreme. Their general condition is far worse than that of the Argentine
railways and there is no possibility of raising new money over here to
provide for rehabilitation, modernisation, etc. There is in fact far less hope
for railways run under British ownership in Uruguay than in Argentina. For
over 15 years there has been no dividend on the Ordinary Shares of the
Central Railway. The Midland last paid in 1896…In short, the Railways
cannot hope to pay their way under foreign ownership, wage increases have
swamped earnings and it is probable that to-day the Railways are not
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earning enough to cover running costs…The Uruguayans should, therefore,
be pressed to take the whole matter in hand, either by guaranteeing a
minimum return on the capital investment or, better still, by buying the
Railways out."7 In a subsequent Treasury memorandum, annotated by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, these concepts were repeated and two new
pieces of information on the Central Uruguay added “ It has the power to
raise rates but the transport structure of Uruguay is developing much more
on the roads. Here we know that the Directors of the Railway would be glad
to sell out, and if we can get a figure round about £5 ½ million, I should
think it would be a good sale.”8 The fact that the railways were free to set
their tariffs is significant, because it made it more difficult to discuss their
problems in intergovernmental discussions. In the Argentine case, were
tariffs had to be approved by the Government, it had been natural to discuss
their problems and their future profits during the Anglo-Argentine
negotiations  of September 1946.
The Anglo-American Financial Agreement  imposed a clear deadline:
sterling earned on current account from 15th July 1947 was convertible
(unless special circumstances forced the UK to ask the US for a brief
moratorium for some countries with whom no agreement had been reached.
A postponement to 15 September 1947 proved necessary for fourteen
countries, including France and Denmark.9
 This deadline had a clear impact on UK-Uruguay economic relations. For
the UK it was crucial to segregate new from old sterling, otherwise her
scarce dollars would not cover current imports but would have been bought
with old sterling;  the ideal was  to freeze as much of Uruguay’s sterling
balances as possible. Uruguay, on the other hand, wanted to have a
substantial sum released in order to pay for dollar imports, which included
imports from Argentina and Brazil. July 1947 was a deadline, but an early
agreement meant that  convertibility could start sooner. The sooner an
agreement was reached, the sooner could Uruguay convert into dollars
sterling acquired in current account transactions. Argentina had enjoyed this
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advantage from the last quarter of 1946 and had been a substantial source of
dollars, Brazil from 1 April 1947.10
There was also the threat of an unilateral British cancellation of a part of
the sterling balances. This would have been a major change in policy, forced
by wider considerations than relations with a single country.  It should
however be kept in mind that Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had
made a few days before the beginning of the formal Anglo- Uruguayan
negotiations a  very public request for cancellation. On May 6, 1947 at the
Brazilian Chamber of Commerce, referring to the over £3 billion of sterling
balances, Dalton declared “This vast accumulation of debt represents an
unreal, unjust, and unsupportable burden. …Sooner or later this mass must
be very substantially scaled down. Britain is strong, but one sign of her
strength must be refusal to take on fantastic commitments which are beyond
her strength and beyond all limits of good sense and fair play.” His
statement in the House of Commons on July 3, on Egyptian sterling
balances, while negotiations with Uruguay were proceeding, are even
stronger.
The Bank of England was totally opposed to this approach, both because it
believed it wouldn’t work and also because it would have dealt a possibly
mortal blow to London as an international financial center. When Keynes
had negotiated with White possible schemes to abolish sterling balances, the
Bank of England had commented, refering to sterling countries that this
“would presumably force them to remove all their current banking business
from London to New York.”11    It would have implied the end of sterling as
an international currency, not a very wise move when deficits were
envisaged for the future.
The Uruguayan Government had at first thought of sending a Mission to
London to collect information but then decided that it was better to give to
the Delegation the task of negotiating an agreement.
 “The reason for this abrupt change of policy would appear to be that the
Uruguayan Government fears that unless the matter of the liquidation of the
blocked sterling funds is arranged by the end of June they may lose the
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immediate use of them, or else, at least, that Great Britain will insist on a
drastic reduction in the use of the sum owed.”12
The railways also informed the Foreign Office that Zorzi, the manager of
the Banco de la Republica seemed to accept the idea of using the sterling
balances to buy the railways, but this seems a very tendentious and
interested version of what was said between Zorzi and Grindley.  Zorzi
opposed this use of Uruguay’s sterling balances and preferred to buy back
foreign debt.
 “Senor Silveiro Zorzi added that from the Uruguayan Treasury and non-
political party point of view, amongst the Government people, there was no
real desire to buy the railways but that it is considered necessary to do so in
order that the Uruguayan Government shall be able to use the blocked funds
to the advantage of Uruguay.”13
The railways had excellent information on the Uruguayan side. In a
telegram of early March from the manager of the Central Uruguay Railway
to his Board in London, giving information on the members of the
Uruguayan Delegation, he mentions someone in terms that raised a few
eyebrows in London. Talking of Dr.Cuadros “ Battllista Deputy, who enjoys
the complete confidence of the President of the Republic, and also that of
the President of the Bank of the Republic”, Grindley adds “Cuadros is an
intimate friend of mine and has offered me his services confidentially and
privately as an inside informant.”14  Not surprisingly, the British
Ambassador in Montevideo thought this was quite odd. “Grindley
mentioned that Cuadros had offered him his services “confidentially and
privately as an inside informant”, which may indeed strike you, as it does
me, as a rather odd idea coming, moreover, specially from Grindley!”15 The
fact that the Railways had access to such good information on the
Uruguayan side could be very helpful, but it could also cause problems for
the British officials. The interests of the Railways and those of the British
Government were similar in the sense that both wanted the railways to be
sold and both wanted Uruguay to pay as high a price as possible. But we
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will see that they were not identical, and that there were areas of potential
conflict. In these cases, the access to information on the part of the railways
could create very awkward situations.
While preparing for the negotiations with Uruguay, there were some
discussions between British officials on the results they wanted to obtain.
On these there was a general agreement and no major interdepartmental
difference, except on cancellation, where the Bank of England constantly
showed its opposition. Negotiations like the ones with Uruguay had already
been carried by the same officials with many other countries and although
each case was different, the general lines had much in common. Eady had
recently dealt with the enormously difficult question of India’s sterling
balances. In the case of India, the transfer of power was announced on June
3: India was the major holder of sterling balances and had suffered the
Bengal famine, with over two million dead of starvation, in part because of
the inflation caused by war financing, of which her sterling balances were a
cause and consequence.
 Already at the beginning of 1947 Eady began planning the negotiations
with Uruguay and decided to reinforce the Treasury calling back Simon
“because the Uruguayan Minister whom we met paid him, and with justice,
considerable deference.” Eady planned to come back from India in mid-
March and  thought that mid-April would be a good time to start
negotiations with Uruguay. He also thought that he would not be in a mood
to offer many concessions. “In any case I shall be very surprised if I return
from this Indian and Middle East trip in an entirely gracious mood.”16 A
Foreign Office official minuted that “Sir W.Eady thinks that the experience
gained in India would be useful in negotiating with the Uruguayans.”17 Eady
had carried the very long and difficult negotiations with the Peronist
Government in 1946 and concluded the Eady-Miranda Agreement. He had
also visited Montevideo at the time and had a good grasp of the issues in
question.
The negotiations were strongly conditioned not only by the general
problems of Great Britain and the Sterling Area, but also by the precedents
set by Britain’s agreements with Argentina and Brazil. This problem was
always present to both sides.
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Already in March the question was raised in a telegram from the British
Ambassador in Montevideo. “It seems that President Berreta is particularly
anxious that terms of any agreement reached should be not (repeat not) less
favourable than those of recent Anglo-Argentine agreement as prestige of
the Uruguayan Government is involved.” He also reported that according to
the Minister of Finance, the President was willing to buy the tramways and
the waterworks but not the railways.18  This produced a sceptical note of  the
head of the Latin American Department at the Foreign Office.
“As regards the Uruguayan desire to be treated pari passu with Argentina,
I fear that the Treasury may make difficulties. Our September agreement
with Argentina gave that country the right to free use of about 20% of her
sterling balance of £125 million. The Treasury are already making great
difficulties about according pari passu treatment to Brazil in respect of her
sterling balance of £65 million; they say that Argentina was a special case,
and that they cannot agree to pari passu treatment for Brazil without
endangering their negotiations with India and Egypt. This argument will, of
course, apply also to the Uruguayan sterling balances."”19 Towards the end
of March Eady envisaged releasing a substantial amount of sterling.
Uruguay’s sterling balances at the end of 1946 were £17.5 million. “On the
basis of the balances as they stand at present I think we could, and should,
agree to pay up to £1 million a year for 4 to 5 years with a revision at the
end of that time. We should try for £4 million over 5 years.20 He envisaged
paying ½% interest. This was a very high rate of release if compared with
other countries, although the rate of interest was extraordinarily low. This
rate of interest, however, was the one prevailing in Britain for short term
loans, and was the consequence of the policy of ultra-cheap money
championed by Dalton. As prices of world commodities were exploding due
to the American decision to decontrol prices, Uruguayan sterling balances
were rapidly loosing their purchasing power.
In talks with the Uruguayan Ambassador an important Treasury official
raised the question of cancellation in early April and Dalton himself wrote a
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rather long minute supporting this action stressing that Britain had protected
Uruguay from Nazism..21
In the meantime things were moving on the question of  the other British
owned public utilities. Commenting on a Press report that the Waterworks
had been sold for £3.25 million and the Tramways for £1.75 million, a
Treasury official saw a possible solution to the existing problems: “If a deal
can be made in regard to the railways, and taking into account the value of
the waterworks and tramways, the whole accumulated sterling balances
should disappear as in the case of the Argentine.”22 Relief at the successful
sale of the tramways was evident in the Bank of England. “Crabbe, after
seven years of donkey-work, has, so Vereker reports in his 57 of the 14th
February, at last managed to trade the derelict trams…”23 Clearly this sale
was the result of a long term effort, of which probably only the Bank of
England, with its close contact with the City, followed closely.
The special circumstances of the early postwar period made it possible to
carry out plans thought out much earlier. While the Board of Trade was
worried that the sale of the British investments in Latin America would
damage the long term prospects of British exports, the Bank of England had
for a long time decided that sale was the best alternative and considered that
the  sterling balances provided an unique occasion of selling at a very
satisfactory price for British shareholders. Otherwise, the British owned
public utilities would face ruin. Powell made this very clear. “As regards the
railways. I do not myself believe that any arrangement- co-ordination of
transport, guaranteed income, mixed company, or what you will- is going to
do the British-owned companies lasting good, and I think that you yourself
are pretty well convinced that an outright sale is the only thing likely to save
some of this British capital from the wreck.”24
Soon afterwards the Uruguayan Ambassador in London discussed pending
matters at the Treasury where it was acknowledged that Uruguay had been a
loyal friend during the war “which strongly inclined us to reach a friendly
settlement. At the same time the range of possible settlement was not
dictated by questions of friendships, but by the hard realities of the financial
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position we had explained.”25 To the suggestion of partial cancellation of
the sterling balances, the Ambassador gave an interesting reply, pointing out
that if Britain wanted this, then, as compensation, it should release more free
sterling from what was left. This suggestion was very unwelcome to the
Bank of England, because if part of the sterling balances were cancelled and
a substantial sum was released, not enough sterling would be left for
Uruguay to buy the railways at a good price. In a way, there was a conflict
of interest between the British taxpayer and British shareholders of
investments in Uruguay. Powell immediately expressed his worry that so
much had been discussed with the Ambassador before the arrival of the
Mission. If discussions concentrated only on sterling and trade, the railways
would be left to their fate. “As a result, Uruguay may take the same
unfortunate turn as Brazil and we may get little or no opportunity to deal
with the Railways and the other Utility problems.”26 A week later, much
stronger words were used. “What, however, does concern and disappoint me
is the Treasury’s apparent abandonment of the Railways in their
difficulties.”27
 On tactics, it was agreed that it was convenient to start by asking Uruguay
to cancel a part of its sterling balances as a gesture of solidarity with Great
Britain. This had already been done with Brazil, who had refused but was
put in the defensive. Referring to negotiations with Brazil, an official
predicted that the same thing would happen.
 “The discussions with Uruguay would probably follow a similar course
(to Brazil GF): we should ask for cancellation, and it would be refused, and
we should proceed to consider all the other points.”28
The case of Uruguay had a peculiar aspect: Uruguay had a substantial
amount of sterling but at the same time it also had a substantial foreign debt
in London. While its sterling assets received ½% interest, its sterling debts
paid a much higher rate. Other countries in this situation had already bought
back its foreign debt (Argentina and Brazil had done so in the last years of
the War), but curiously Uruguay had delayed action. It is also not surprising
that the British side tried to see if it could prevent this from happening.
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“The idea of repatriating UK assets in Uruguay has been mentioned and
the intention would appear to be to redeem what are in the main
remunerative investments. However natural this may be from an Uruguayan
point of view, inevitably it must cause us grave preoccupations. Indeed if
carried through it might mean that our remaining stake in Uruguay was
completely unremunerative.”29
Clearly, if there was any hope of selling the railways, it was essential to
prevent Uruguay from buying back its debt, for there was not enough
sterling for both operations (if British shareholders were to get a good
price). If a sale proved impossible, another possible solution was to obtain a
guarantee of a minimum income for the railways. Argentina had given such
a guarantee in the Eady- Miranda Agreement in September 1946. But the
more Uruguay spent buying back its debt, the less sterling there would be
available  for British shareholders. This was the crucial point, and we will
return to it often.  It should be kept in mind that Uruguay was perfectly
within its right to use its sterling for buying back its sterling debt, without
any discussions whatsoever. “It is probably true that if the Uruguayans care
to accelerate their redemption they are strictly within their rights, but this
course would not be very welcome to us. Apart from the obvious fact that, if
the Uruguayans spend their money on buying bonds from which we derive a
regular income they will have none for the Railways (which bring in
nothing)..”30  Uruguay’s major mistake was to accept to discuss the question
of debt redemption  at all.
During the negotiations the Uruguayan Ambassador made an able
exposition of the origin of their sterling balances: they had arisen out of
normal exports, subsidised by Uruguay through a preferential rate of
exchange, they had lost purchasing power through inflation and Uruguay
had to spend approximately 10 % of their value in dollar imports in order to
be able to export to Britain. Presumably this was a rough calculation of the
cost of tinplate, oil and similar goods that had to be imported from the dollar
area in order to export to Britain. He also emphasised the fact that Britain
paid Uruguay ½% for her sterling debts while obtaining a much higher
interest on Uruguay’s sterling debts. He proposed a five year agreement,
with part of the balances to be spent in the repatriation of a part of the debt,
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a part in buying some Utility Companies (Tramways and possible
Waterworks) and , as a sign of goodwill, a part in buying an Embassy and in
scholarships for Uruguayan students. Eady replied stressing the enormous
debts of the UK “£4000 million was not a sum which we could manage to
repay in less than a century. Had the Uruguayans, he asked, considered
adjusting the amount of their balances or was the present level to be
maintained as the book debt?”31
Maceachen replied saying that sterling balances should not be cancelled
and said that they wanted about half to be used for repatriation of debt and
half released, although he made it clear that a smaller release was
acceptable. To think of having half of their sterling released for current
transactions with the rest of the world (basically dollars)was wildly
optimistic because other countries, in a much stronger bargaining position,
had obtained a much smaller proportion of their sterling released. He also
informed the British delegation that his Mission was not empowered to
discuss the purchase of the Railways nor a minimum guaranteed income for
them.
Eady expressed surprise that in this way “we had thereby been excluded
from discussing the two main aspects of our principal Foreign investment in
Uruguay.”
As it was not obvious that a private company should be discussed in the
context of inter- governmental negotiations, Eady felt it was necessary to
explain more fully the position of the British Government on this question,
which, as we will see, caused trouble even after everything had been
concluded.
“Sir Wilfrid Eady pointed out that we were not here to discuss the value of
the railways, but from our balance of payments point of view we had to
consider their position in relation to the releases which it would be possible
for us to make. In our negotiations with Argentina the question of the
sterling balances, meat and railways, were closely related – the Argentines
had to consider what income they might expect from sales of meat, and we
had to consider our likely income from the railways. In the past the British
Government had given no more than diplomatic protection to investments
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abroad, but our present financial position made it essential for us to pay
special regard to our income from such investments.”
When Posadas pointed out that Uruguay wanted to repatriate between £7
million and £10 million of its sterling debt, and suggested to discuss the
sterling balances in this light, Eady was very dismissive and ended the
meeting.
“Sir Wilfrid Eady pointed out that the repatriation of their debt meant a
further charge on us, since we would have to bear in mind the subsequent
loss of income. He disliked going back to the Chancellor on the basis of the
Uruguayan attitude, and asked them seriously to considere the points we had
made.”
After the meeting Powell gave his evaluation of how the negotiations were
proceeding, making it clear that the Bank of England had no faith in the
possibility of cancellation of a part of the sterling balances, a subject in
which Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was very keen.
Things were developing as expected: “This morning’s meeting went very
much according to plan,…”but it was important to deal with the railways.
“As you know, I have always felt that a satisfactory Railway settlement is
far more important to us in Uruguay than cancellation, but as a matter of
fact, unless I am gravely mistaken, the chances of the latter on a worth while
scale are non-existent.”32  In order to keep the negotiations going, Powell
proposed  to follow a suggestion made by Posadas  “A certain amount to be
hypothecated to the redemption of debt (the Banco de la Republica seem to
think that £7 million would suffice) against which the Uruguayans would
agree to a similar hypothecation, or alternatively a guarantee for the
Utilities, including the Railways  -releases to be dependent upon our
receiving satisfaction of our claims for the Railways.. The trouble is that the
difference between  maximum and minimum releases must necessarily be
small and I fear that the Uruguayans still cherish extravagant views about
the actual amount we would release if they met us.”33
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Although official negotiations continued and minutes of the discussions
are available, the real negotiations  occurred outside their formal framework.
The Uruguayan Ambassador had rapidly emerged as the leading figure of
his team: he was clear, forceful and well informed and presented the case for
his country in a reasonable and effective way. On the British side it was
clearly perceived that it would be useful to weaken him.
After a meeting of the Delegations, Powell raised the problem in a letter to
Eady. “It is a pity that Maceachen, mainly because of his English, should be
leading the Uruguayans- by the nose. However, in conversation with some
of his colleagues from Uruguay, I detected a distinctly critical note of their
self-constituted leader.”34
As members of the Uruguayan Delegation were unwise in making negative
comments about people on their own side, it was natural for the British side
to exploit this cleavage and treat some members of the Uruguayan
Delegation in a privileged way. Posadas became important. He was taken by
Powell and a Treasury official  to the country for a day, and gave very
useful information on the political cleavages in Uruguay on the various
aspects of the negotiation and gave his personal opinion of how to deal with
political opposition in Montevideo and gave the impression that in a future
trip to Paris  he would try to convince a powerful Uruguayan politician. He
also showed himself inclined to the minimum income for the Railways, a
key point that his Delegation had rejected out of hand.35
A good synthesis of how the negotiations developed is given in a letter
from Simon, who was to head a Mission to Uruguay, to Vereker, the British
Ambassador in Montevideo.
“The opening stages of our discussions were thus very difficult and indeed,
after several official meetings with the Uruguayan Mission at which Mac
Eachan acted as spokesman, it became evident that no progress would be
made in formal negotiations. The whole of the Agreement was therefore
worked out, backstage, with Posados,(sic!) in very friendly conversations at
meals etc. and the Uruguayan Mission never met us again officially, until
the formal signature took place in the Foreign Office with the traditional
glass of sherry afterwards.
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MacEachan had, of course, to fall in line with the others and to make the
best of having been over-ridden.”36
The Agreement was valid from July 15th 1947, the deadline imposed by
the Anglo-American Financial Agreement. It was agreed that sterling would
be used for trade and financial transactions between the two countries and
Uruguay would get convertibility for sterling obtained through current
account transactions  (Account N°1). The sterling balances (£17 million)
would be blocked in a N°2 Account, with ½% interest, this interest payable
in free sterling. Only £1 million was released immediately and a further
£700.000 would be released one year after the Agreement came into force.
Releases  were about 10% of balances A further £1.8 million could be
released for the purchase of the Tramways, £120.000 for an Embassy
building in London and £130.000 for bursaries. There were strong
inducements for Uruguay to buy the railways. If Uruguay bought “British
Transport Undertakings”, and the British Government approved the price, a
further £4 million would be released, but if a  part was  not used for this
purpose it would be blocked. A further £3 million could be used to buy
Transport undertakings, and the rest again for purchases of transport
companies and repatriation of loans. If there was an agreement with the
Transport companies before the end of 1948, a further £1.5 would be
released between that date and July 1951. The whole deal was designed to
give Uruguay a strong incentive to buy the railways. On an  similar formula
discussed a few days earlier a Treasury official commented to a Foreign
Office official:  “I do not think it is at all unfavourable on the face of it,
though I do not know if we shall really be able to bring them to buy the
railways. The whole shape of the formula is designed to put as large a carrot
as possible before them to induce them to do so.”37
This was a complete British success. First of all, Uruguay did not redeem
any part of its debt. Just by discussing the matter, it weakened a most
important right, a thing that had not been done neither by Argentina nor
Brazil, who were well aware that they had the right to use freely their
sterling to buy back their sterling debt. The date of the agreement was in the
last possible day (although Britain could have asked the US for a
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postponement for making convertible Uruguayan current account sterling).
On that same July 15th Britain signed Convertibility Agreements with three
other countries: Iran, Sweden and Ethiopia.38  Uruguay therefore enjoyed
the advantages of convertibility for a very short period, as convertibility was
suspended on August 20 1947. It must be noted, however, that Uruguay’s
surplus with the sterling area was not significant, and that therefore
convertibility became less important than for a country like Argentina, with
an enormous sterling surplus. On the other hand Uruguay did not get the
right to use blocked sterling to pay for a future deficit with the Sterling
Area. Argentina had asked and obtained this right in September 1946; it
would have proved very useful for Uruguay after the nationalisation of the
railways. Releases into convertible sterling were small, much smaller than
those envisaged a few months before. This however was mainly due to the
dramatic deterioration of Britain’s dollar position in the preceding weeks.
What seemed affordable in 1946 or early 1947 was out of the question in
July. In 1947 the trade balance of Great Britain, instead of improving,
deteriorated dramatically; its dollar balance worsened even more.
The position of the Railways was therefore much strengthened: if Uruguay
had much sterling blocked which paid almost no interest, it became almost
inevitable to spend this almost useless money in buying them. In order to
leave no doubts, in a Note exchange accompanying the payments agreement
it was stated that the British Government would send a delegation to
Uruguay to discuss the purchase of the railways. The sale was now an
official aim made public.
It is impossible to understand these and the following negotiations without
taking into account Uruguay’s attitude towards Britain. One of the main
obstacles to the sale of the railways was the widespread wish, in Uruguayan
ruling circles, to keep close ties with Britain. “Incidentally, one of the
arguments we have repeatedly met with has been the desire of the
Uruguayans, for political and economic reasons, to keep this British
investment in their country.”39The speech made by Gallinal, the head of the
Mission to London, in the Uruguayan Senate on 2 December 1947, is very
explicit. The Uruguayan Government had instructed the Mission “que debia
actuar teniendo en cuenta la enorme deuda de gratitud que el mundo libre
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debe a Gran Bretana…(Apoyados)..que debia actuar pensando que algun
sacrificio que nuestra economia hiciera para apoyar, en la medida de
nuestras débiles fuerzas, a Gran Bretana, era un sacrificio justificado porque
representaba devolver, en minima parte, los grandes bienes recibidos
durante la épica lucha por las libertades humanas y doblemente justificado
porque durante su historia, a partir de los dias de la independencia, el
Uruguay no ha tenido amigo mas leal y mas cordial que el pueblo de Gran
Bretana, al que lo anudan lazos que queremos mantener para el futuro y no
aflojar ni olvidar el las horas de prueba. Llevamos instrucciones que no nos
convertian en una mision que va a cobrar una deuda con el criterio estrecho
y ciego, del acreedor de estrechas miras…El convenio que hemos suscrito-
no soy un financista, y a veces me felicito de no serlo- no creo que sea,
fundamentalmente, un convenio financiero hecho de acuerdo con formulas
técnicas. Es, esencialmente, un convenio politico entre dos pueblos amigos
y por el cual solucionan las dificultades creadas por el caos financiero
original al atravesar una de las mas siniestras encrucijadas de la historia,
preparandose para reanudar sus relaciones de todo orden en el porvenir.”
The dollar situation of the United Kingdom became much more serious
than envisaged in 1946 and the whole postwar financial strategy collapsed
when convertibility had to be suspended in August 20, 1947. This was a
very heavy blow for many countries and destroyed the foundations of many
postwar agreements. The American Loan Agreement as well as many others
had to be revised. In the case of Uruguay,  releases meant now something
totally different than before; furthermore, exports to Britain would not get
convertible sterling. On the same day that Embassies abroad were informed
of the suspension of convertibility, a telegram to the British Embassy in
Montevideo stressed the need for the railway sale. “His Majesty’s
Government hope that the Uruguayan Government will agree that the
present situation strengthens the need for the utilisation of Uruguay’s
accumulated balances in the manner laid down in the Agreement,
particularly so far as this concerns the settlement of outstanding railway
problems.”40
There was no advantage whatsoever for Uruguay to ratify the agreement
signed a few weeks before. “Although we have every hope that they will do
so, you will appreciate that two of the principal attractions for them have
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ceased to operate i.e. dollar convertibility as mentioned in Article 6 (A) and
Article 13 of agreement.”41 Like many other Central Banks, including the
Argentine one, the Banco de la Republica suspended quotations for sterling.
On September 10th Argentina even announced a ban on shipments to
Britain, as exports there seemed useless, although the ban was soon lifted.
A major aim of  British financial diplomacy was now to get Uruguay to
ratify the agreement, as it meant officially blocking old sterling and
discussing the sale of the railways. Once again, when official channels
proved inflexible, private conversations with more favourably inclined
Uruguayans officials were very useful. In this case also La Gama played an
important role, convincing the highest authorities of the advantages of
ratifying the agreement.  “He  was also (Simon told me afterwards) a bit
worried about McEachan, but decided during lunch to side-track him and
write privately to Silvera Zorzi recommending the resumption of quotations
amd early ratification.”42Also Zorzi had to be side-tracked. “Zorzi is a
slippery customer and is not going to renounce a claim to dollars without a
struggle. I am not at all sure however that Simon and Powell will want to
deal primarily with him: I think they will pin their faith on Posadas….In
short our best line is to tell Montevideo to keep out of Zorzi’s way until
Simon arrives.”43
After November 20th 1947 there were in Montevideo two different
missions: the official Simon Mission, whose aim was to help to make
possible the sale of the railways  and then there was the mission of the
railways themselves, who conducted the actual negotiations. As it was
impossible to disentangle the railways from the rest of Anglo-Uruguayan
economic relations, the Simon Mission had to deal with many crucial
problems, including the guarantee given to Uruguay for its sterling holdings,
Uruguayan relations with the rest of the sterling area as well as other
commercial questions. And in some occasions when a crisis exploded in the
railway negotiations, the Simon Mission proved invaluable. I will follow
here only the railway negotiations.
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Their first task was to get the Agreement ratified. In order to obtain
approval in Congress the Minister of Finance advised not to mention the
railways.44. “Minister stated that the attitude of the Chambers towards the
purchase of the railways was unfavourable at the moment.”
If the Chambers were to feel that by ratifying the agreement they were
automatically committed in advance to the purchase of the railways they
might well refuse ratification. Minister therefore advises most strongly
against any discussion or reference to the sale of the railways until
agreement has been actually ratified.”45 Posadas later claimed to have been
important in changing the attitude of the Uruguayan Government towards
ratification. “Posadas has told me that, when the convertibility bombshell
fell in August, the President and leading Ministers became opposed to the
ratification of the Payments Agreement, but that when he (Posads) arrived
back from Paris he was able to persuade them to go on with it.”46 The death
of Berreta had also introduced a different climate that could affect the sale
of the railways. While Berreta wanted to govern alone, his successor wanted
an agreement with the Herrerista Party. “The Herreristas, who had been
violently opposing the purchase of the Tramway Co., have now been won
over by promises of Directorships of the ‘Ente Autonomo’ which will
control a co-ordinated Montevideo traffic system….Some such inducements
may ultimately be offered in the event that the Railways are purchased,
whereas an outright Herrerista opposition might well have made the not too
popular purchase proposal quite unacceptable.” (Harris to Simon, 27
September 1947,cit).
The Senate ratified the Agreement on December 2nd 1947; in the other
Chamber our old friend Cuadros was present. “The Ratification Bill has
now to go to the Chamber of Deputies where Quadros (sic), as President of
the Foreign Affairs Committee, told me he would be the rapporteur. He said
passage was assured and would be effected in the next fortnight.”47 The
Chamber of Deputies approved the Agreement on December 17th 1947.
At the beginning the Simon Mission stood aside “available for consultation
at any time by either side and ready to intervene if any deadlock arose. It
took some time to get the negotiations direct with the Railways Directors
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started, especially as before we arrived there was a strong feeling adverse to
purchase at all. On two occasions contact was lost and we had to intervene
in order to get things going again.”
Because of its position, the Simon Mission did not get involved in actual
bargaining when the Uruguayans finally decided to buy the railways. The
first figures the Simon Mission actually discussed was when Fabini, a
member of the Uruguayan Delegation, told them that the evaluations of
experts ranged from £2 million to £5,7 million, and that Fabini would do his
best to get an agreement for an offer of £5.7 million, “but still had political
difficulties. 3. Without involving ourselves in bargaining at this stage we
implied clearly that the figure was disappointing and that we had been
thinking on a considerably higher plane. 4. If he succeeds in getting his
commission to offer 5.7 million to the railway delegation there is a chance
of screwing him up to 6.5 million.”48 A very interesting fact is that the
Simon Mission did not inform the railway delegation of this crucial offer. In
part this may have been because personal relations had become difficult, in
part because Simon and Powell were very clear that they had been consulted
as representatives of the British Government and not of the railways. In
those same days there were frantic negotiations concerning whether to
bilateralise trade between Uruguay and Great Britain and other questions of
similar importance; probably the attitude of the railway delegation was
creating strains with the Uruguayan Government.“6.We have not (repeat
not) told the railways of this conversation which was secret and personal to
us as Government representatives.” (idem)  On February 12th, 1948, the
Andes Agreement was signed between Argentina and Great Britain, which
among other things, concluded the sale of the British railways in Argentina
for £150 million.
In Montevideo, meanwhile, very important questions were being settled:
on February 18th  Simon and Zorzi agreed in Montevideo that Uruguay
would not remain any longer in the transferable sterling area49. At the same
time, a potentially explosive issue arose: the price paid by Britain for
Uruguayan meat. The Minister for Foreign Affairs demanded that Uruguay
be paid the same price obtained by Argentina. What was especially
worrying were the possible implications for the railway sale. “It is
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particularly embarrassing that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has raised
this question especially in such a vehement manner as he was until he
became Minister a member of the railway negotiating commission and will
be concerned with cabinet approval of the sale contract which we hope is
now approaching conclusion. A blank refusal or temporising reply might
well upset the railway deal and also affect commercial
relations."”50Although genuine friendship towards Britain was widespread
in Uruguay the question of meat remained potentially very dangerous
because it touched directly the interests of important social groups. It may
be worth mentioning that when Eady had visited Montevideo in 1946, while
Miranda the Argentine negotiator was bargaining very hard,  the Minister of
Agriculture was opposed to the Argentine tactics. “At dinner last night the
Minister expressed himself freely to me about the madness of the Argentine
policy in pushing up the price of all their products."”51Eady had in those
days been extremely outspoken when Gigovre, the Acting President of the
Banco de la Republica, had expressed his unease at the rapid growth of
sterling balances. “From the financial angle, therefore, we said the only way
of working down the balance, at an early date, was by means of purchase by
the Uruguayans of British-owned public utilities such as the water-works
(already before Congress), the Railways and trams.”(Note by Eady, 3
September 1946, cit.). These aims had not changed in the following year
and a half.
Three days later the sale of the railways was agreed.  “The Railway
directors, flushed with triumph, reported to us at 3 o’clock on the 21st
February the result of their morning meeting with the subcommittee of the
Uruguayan Commission. They said that they had obtained a final offer from
the Uruguayans of £7.2 million which they had accepted, subject to certain
adjustments of assets and liabilities as at 30th June 1947 and to our
agreement.”52
In earlier negotiations the railways had asked for £10.7 million to which
the Uruguayans had proposed little more than £5,7 million, basing
themselves on the stock market prices. The offer was subsequently
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increased to £6.2 and £6.5 million, while the railways counterproposed £7.5
million. The Uruguayan side then offered £6.9 million less some railway
liabilities which they believed were £400.000, that is, apparently remained
at £6.5 million. These liabilities were however only £50.000 so that the offer
was for £6.850.000. On the last day the railways came down to £7.25
million and finally accepted a counteroffer of £7.2 million “subject only to
adjustment of the liability question and to our approval.” On receiving these
news, Simon congratulated Hammond and the directors “adding that it
might be of some satisfaction to them to know that the figure they had
accepted was, in our opinion and from such experience as we had gained in
discussions with members of the Government and others, the highest
possible in all the circumstances.” Then an extraordinary thing happened.
Hammond exploded with accusations that the Treasury and the Simon
Mission had been unhelpful.
“4. Simon’s remarks were immediately followed by a violent outburst by
Hammond against the Mission and His Majesty’s Treasury which he
prefaced with the remark that he had bottled it up during his whole stay in
Montevideo. It was poisonous in the extreme. He alleged that we had
wilfully withheld information, that we had deliberately given them
depressing news, that far from helping we had proved a handicap, that Sir
Wilfrid Eady had told them they would be lucky if they got £6 million. (It
has been privately alleged by Grindley, though this was not mentioned at the
meeting, that Sir Wilfrid Eady had told Posadas in London that Uruguay
could get the Railways for a figure which he understood was about £6
million.)”
From the beginning of their Mission Simon and Powell had been worried
about possible accusations from the railways. It was in the national interest
to convince Uruguay to use its sterling balances to buy the railways; this
prevented their use to redeem debt, which was a much better asset and also
solved a part of the problem of British indebtedness to Uruguay. The higher
the price paid by Uruguay, the better, especially for the British balance of
payments in a very critical moment. But it was against the national interest
for the railways destroying the deal by asking an unrealistic price. This was
further complicated by the fact that the railways expectations were greatly
increased by the diplomatic support they were getting. This placed the
Simon Mission in a difficult position “from the first we realised that there
was a danger that His Majesty’s Government and we might be accused of
“grinding the railways down”.” It was also because of this that Simon and
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Powell did not want to get directly involved in the negotiations, providing
only support and making it possible for talks to continue when they had
broken down, which happened in two occasions.
“Our job was therefore to inflate the Uruguayans by attempting to raise a
willingness to purchase at a fair price by saying that His Majesty’s
Government would not be satisfied with a poor deal and by implication,
linking this with the balance available on blocked account (say some £8
million), some of which the Uruguayans wished to retain for debt
redemption. At the same time we had to the best of our ability to keep the
Railway directors from thinking in the clouds on the strength of His
Majesty’s Government’s support.” In the last stages of the negotiations, the
Railway directors asked “full support” from Simon and Powell when the
remaining difference was between the £7.5 million asked and the £7.2
million offered. Although the railways were invited to continued to aim for
the higher figure Simon and Powell refused to be committed to a specific
figure as a “breaking” figure, and expressed doubts whether the railways
could get £7.5 million even with full diplomatic support.
As we have seen, only one important piece of information was withheld
from Simon to the railway delegation: the figures mentioned by Fabini
under pledge of secrecy, but these figures were given to the railways soon
afterwards, during the negotiations, by the Uruguayans themselves. But, as
we have already seen,  the railways had excellent information from the
Uruguayan side, and presumable knew everything that was said during the
negotiations between the two Governments, including some hints made by
the British who would have preferred to have them kept secret from the
railways. We have seen  that the Railway directors could refer to a
conversation between Eady and Posadas, a clear proof that there were
important leakages. Paradoxically enough, sometimes one has the
impression that the leakages to the Railways were more frequent from the
Uruguayan than from the British side.  And the Railway delegation was,
perhaps because of this, very suspicious of the Simon delegation; the
personal relations between the two British delegations were often difficult
and sometimes unpleasant. (“Although we had little from Hammond during
the voyage out and subsequently, except unpleasantness,…”). The railways’
suspicions of the attitude of the British Government were so strong that they
sometimes openly refused to inform Simon of  how the negotiations were
proceeding; strangely enough they also completely misunderstood the
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Payments Agreement between the two countries, that had been the key
instrument in forcing Uruguay to buy the railways.
“It should perhaps be added that there has always been an ineradicable
misunderstanding in the minds of the Railway directors about the
relationship of the Payments Agreement to the Railway problem. At one
stage in the proceedings, they explained their unwillingness to give us
information  about the bids made by the Commission by saying that “they
feared that we should report it to London and that, if they secured too high a
figure, we should beat them down”. Explain as we might that the Payments
Agreement neither bound them to a minimum or a maximum figure but was
merely the instrument which gave them the chance they had been seeking,
the atmosphere of suspicion persisted and they continued to regard the
Payments Agreement as a kind of trap.”
On the 23rd of February the railway directors visited the British
Ambassador. They felt that Fabini and the Uruguayan Commission “had
gone to the limit of their authority” with their high offer, but when asked
whether the Ambassador could help, for example by a visit to the President,
they asked him to try to get £8 million. The Ambassador consulted Simon
and Powell, who pointed out that the deal had been already agreed (subject
to the question of the liabilities) and that on the 21st the Railway directors
had told them that it was useless to try to get more than £7.2 million. “As
regards this latest proposal, there were risks of upsetting the deal by going
over the heads of the Commission which is essentially political and an all
party body.” Simon and Powell clearly felt it was dangerous to try to reopen
the negotiations but given the previous problems with the Railway directors,
did not want to seem enemies of the railways. They therefore told the
Ambassador that as their object was to get as much as possible, if he thought
that his intervention could be useful, they would welcome it. In a further
meeting with both the Railway delegation and the Simon Mission, the
Ambassador, having heard from Hammond that Fabini had gone to the limit
of his authority and had consulted the President twice and also that the
directors had already accepted the Uruguayan offer, decided that it was
unlikely that his intervention would get results. He feared that the deal could
collapse or even get mixed up in the meat negotiations. He therefore decided
not to intervene, as the sum offered by Uruguay  was “a fair bargain”.53
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After long negotiations it was agreed that, because of the railway
liabilities, £50.000 had to be deducted from the £7.2 million, making the
final sum £7.150.000. Simon and Powell tried to obtain £7.2 million but on
midnight of February 27th “the Directors asked us (since confirmed in
writing) to desist from further efforts as they feared that this might upset the
deal owing to political rifts that had set in.”54 The danger of a collapse of the
sale for a moment seemed very real. “Both Simon and I were disappointed
that at least the full £7.2 million was not obtained but, in the light of the
Directors’ last minute fears (bordering on panic) we felt we could not stand
out any longer.”55
The result, from the British point of view, was very satisfactory and much
higher than what was expected one year earlier when Dalton had authorised
negotiations with a significantly lower objective. “As for the Railways, you
will agree that the figure is better than expected and much better than the £5
½  million on which the late Chancellor authorised the Payments Agreement
negotiations (your Minute of March 21st, 1947 to the Chancellor), an
appreciably larger sum back from this unremunerative foreign investment
than was anticipated.”56
The key for this success was in the earlier financial negotiations, which
had ended in a result that made the sale of the railways almost inevitable.
This was stressed by Eady when the negotiations had been successfully
concluded. “If it had not been for the way we handled the Uruguayans last
summer there would have been no discussions about the sale of the railways
and if it had not been for Walter’s skill in getting Posadas on our side this
price would not have been achieved….One thing is quite certain- that this
price would not have been obtained had you and Walter not used your skill
to pack away the blocked sterling last summer in such a manner that it could
come out for the railway deal.”57
I hope that, at this stage, the reader will agree that this was a vital fact that
explains much of what happened.
I have stressed here the financial aspects of the negotiations, both because
of their importance and because of their complexity. I have carefully
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refrained from entering into wider aspects, such as the relationships that
may exist between the sale of the railways and the economic development of
Uruguay. I think, however, that it may be useful to indicate one aspect of
these wider questions: it refers to British exports.
Given the enormous demands of the home market, where Labour was
carrying out very deep social changes, and the problems of the balance of
payments, Great Britain had to choose very carefully where to send her
scarce exports of essential goods. The harder the currency of a country, the
higher was the priority on the export list. If a country had been willing to
accumulate passively sterling balances it would have been useless to export
to her steel and coal, which could be sent to more demanding countries.
Britain could also not afford to send goods to countries who lacked dollars
and with whom she had a surplus, as it would have meant accumulating
useless inconvertible credits. The ideal was to have a surplus with a country
that paid with dollars and a deficit with a country that accepted to
accumulate sterling.
Trade agreements in the early postwar period very often specified essential
commodities to be exchanged: in the Andes Agreement, for example, both
meat and coal were clearly indicated. Uruguay, by being too accomodating,
sacrificed the opportunity to get more scarce goods which would have
helped her economic development. This does not mean that the sterling used
to buy the railways could have been used to buy capital goods; it means
however that by spending all her sterling and not buying back her debt,
Uruguay soon found herself in difficulties.
After the collapse of convertibility in August 1947, British officials looked
with great care at the prospective balance of payments with different
countries.  As early as November 1947 they were aware that Uruguay could
be short of sterling in 1948.  The implication of this was that it was
unnecessary to send to Uruguay scarce goods, although it was unwise to do
so in a blatant way. “ONC will want to consider export policy to Uruguay.
Instinct prompts me against any kind of violent shut-down, though plainly it
isn’t a destination for our scarcest goods.”58 Uruguay was not aware of this,
and granted very generous and flexible import permits, accepting luxury
goods like whisky and not demanding explicitly scarce goods. Zorzi saw the
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end of sterling convertibility as a return to the trading patterns of the thirties.
“Zorzi admitted quite frankly that Uruguay was forced to turn to the
bilateral trading arrangements made before the war when she was short of
foreign currency…”59 ; he also promised to keep trade balanced and
therefore to be generous with imports from the Sterling Area.60
This was a serious misreading of the situation, and even in January 1948
Zorzi was worried about accumulating too much sterling.61
Even when goods were available, Uruguay’s friendly behaviour was not
rewarded. In March 1948, with the end of the British winter, coal was
finally available for export and the British Embassy in Montevideo was
informed that the National Coal Board was willing to sell to Uruguay
200.000 tons. The reply was discouraging:  “I consider present moment
inopportune to inform Uruguayans about coal since there is no present
equivalent concession which we can at the moment hope to extract.
Opportunity may however occur later.”62 But at this stage it was in the
interest of the National Coal Board to sell and the offer was made anyway.63
By April 1948 Uruguay had exhausted her sterling, it had still its old
sterling debt to service and had to pay £4 million for goods already ordered
but that still had not arrived. The Banco de la Republica was forced to ask to
the Bank of England for a temporary loan of £2 million.64
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